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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
No.

lx

7983

THE :\lATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF

RIGHTS TO THE USE OF 'YATER OF BEAR

RIVER

DRAIN-

AGE ...:\.REA IX RICH CorxTY, STATE OF UTAH

RANDOLPH LAxD

& Ln'"EBTOCK CoMPANY, A CoRPORA-

TION; DEsERET LIVESTOCK CoMPANY, A CoRPORATION;
BouNTIFUL LIVESTOCK

CoMPANY,

A

CoRPORATION;

HAROLD SEL~IAN, NICK CHOURNOS, ORVAL JOHNSON,
AXD

1YILLIAM

J OHXSOX, OB.JECTORS AND APPELLANTS

v.
THE

U XITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

\YATER CLAIMANT

AND RESPONDENT
THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
RESPONDENT

MOTION TO DISMISS

Comes now the United States of America, acting
by and through J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney
General, and A. Pratt Kesler, United States Attorney for the District of Utah, under and pursuant
to the authority of the Attorney General of the
United States, and appears specially for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court as to the United States of· America, and
for no other purpose, and moves this Court to
dismiss this cause as against the United States of
America for want of jurisdiction over it upon the following grounds and for the following reasons:
(1)
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1. The United States of America has neither consented to be sued nor waived its immunity frmn suit
under the facts and circumstances which prevail in the
above-entitled cause.
2. The United States of America was not a party to
the case in the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, In and For the County
of Rich, In the Matter of the General Determination
of the Rights to the Use of Water of the Bear River
and its Tributaries, Both Surface and Underground,
and to the Use of All Waters of the Drainage of Said
Streams in Rich County, State of Utah, Civil No. 299,
nor to the judgment of that Court and may not now
be made a defendant in the cause to which this motion
relates.
3. There was no authority in the then United States
Attorney nor in the Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation, who purported to represent the United
States of A1nerica in the subject cause in the District
Court, to appear for, or to stipulate on behalf of the
United States of America in regard to its rights to the
use of water.
4. There is no justiciable controversy before this
Court.
Wherefore the United States of America prays that
this cause be dismissed against the United States of
.America for the reasons expressed above and predicated upon the authorities in support of this motion
set forth in the accompanying brief.

J. LEE RANKIN,
Assistant Attorney Gf'ueral .
.A. PRATT KESLER,
United States Attoruey.
NOVEMBER

,

1953.
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OPINION BELOW

There was entt•red on February 7, 1953, by Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge of the First Judicial
District Court, Rich Colmty, State of Utah, an interlocutory decree dismissing appellants' objections.
From that decrep this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Attorney General of the State of Utah filed on
May 14, 1945, in the District Court of the First
Judicial District in and for Rich Connty, State of
Utah, an amended petition* in this action in which
he prayed for "a deeree * * * adjudicating the
relative rights of all \Vater users on the Bear River
and tributaries, both surface and nnderground, and
the drainage within the watersheds of said streams,
in Rich County, State of Utah, in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter 4, Title 100, Revised Statutes
of Utah, 1933, as amended.''
The Attorney General of the United States was
not served with process in the action. No effort was
made to join the United States of America as a party
to the cause. Several years subsequent to the initia·
tion of the action, representatives of the Bureau
Land Management of the Department of the Interior
and of the Forest Service of the Department of Agri·
culture made filings with the State Engineer of the
State of Utah purporting to appropriate water on
lands, title of which resides in the United States of
America. There were in the aggregate thirty-five
(35) filings made with the State Engineer.1 Thirty-

of

*The original petition was filed by the State Engineer on July
13, 1942; the amendment to that petition was filed by the Attorney
General of the State of Utah.
1
R. 14.
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two (32) of the filings were made by the Bureau of
Land Management, three ( 3), by the Forest Service.
On or about April 2, 1951, the Forest Service filed
twelve (12) additional claims with the State Engineer of the State of Utah. Those are referred to
throughout as ''diligence claims.'' A priority date
of 1875 was asserted for certain of those rights by the
Forest Service. The claimed priority date was predicated upon the use of the water by livestock, which
from the date last mentioned to the present time have
been grazed upon the public domain.
The State Engineer approved all of the filings
originally made by the Bureau of Land Management
and the Forest Service. 2 However, twelve (12) of
those original filings approved by the State Engineer,
it is reported, subsequently lapsed or were withdrawn.3
In accordance with the laws of the State of Utah
and pursuant to the statutory procedure in actions
of this character there was issued by the State Engineer of that State a "Proposed Determination of Water
Rights in Bear River, Rich County, Utah Drainage
Area." Listed by the State Engineer in the proposed
determination were the claims of the Bureau of Land
Management and the Forest Service. In that document it was recommended by the State Engineer that
there be an allowance of all of those claims. Objections were filed by the appellants to the proposed determination. Those objections are set forth in the
brief filed by the appellants in this appeal. Praying
for judgment, the appellants petitioned the court as
follows:
2R. 14.
R. 14.

9

i

l
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1. That an order now be issued awarding no
part of the "rater rights as listed herein to the
United States of Ainerica, and which order shall
adjudge and decree that the United States of
An1erica has never made and is unable to make
a beneficial use of waters for livestock watering purposes as is contemplated and required
by the laws of the State of Utah; that such
beneficial use is necessary to complete an appropriation of waters in this State, and rejecting
each application and diligence claim filed by
the United States of America as listed .herein.
2. Ordering and directing the State Engineer
to immediately reject each of the applications
filed by the United States of America as herem
listed, together with any other application for
similar appropriations which might have been
filed for or in behalf of the United States; and
ordering and directing the State Engineer to
issue such notices as may be required to show
the denial of each of the diligence claims filed
for the use of waters in the drainage area herein concerned.
Predicated upon the proceedings of August 20,
.- 1952, before Honorable Judge Lewis Jones/ a stipulation was filed on September 10, 1952, Exhibit I of
this brief. That stipulation was signed by the then
Dnited States Attorney 5 and purports to bind the
:• United States of America. At the hearing of Sep..:_
-" tember 13, 1952,6 the objection was made by appellants
to the priority date of 1875 asserted in connection
with the diligence claims as above mentioned. An
attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation, purporting
'R. 28.
GR.12.
R. 44.
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to act for the United States of America, agreed that
the priority date of 1875 should be changed to 1899,
one year subsequent to the most recent priority date
of the appellants. 7 The Attorney General of the
United States of America has not authorized any
Assistant Attorney General, any United States Attorney or the attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation
to act on behalf of the United States of America
under the circumstances which prevail in this case.
Predicated upon the trial of the issues, 8 upon the
stipulation,9 upon the agreement by the Attorney for
the Bureau of Reclamation/0 the court issued a memorandum opinion/1 dated the 12th day of January,
1953. Among other things, the court there declared
that:
* * * in each case of appropriation of water
by the United States from the same stream or
other source of supply, the priority of objectors' rights may be shown in the final decree as
senior to the priority of the Government's
rights. 12
Judge Jones likewise declared in his memorandum:
* * * in view of the waiver of priority on the
part of the government, I do not feel that a
justiciable controversy is presented for determina tion. 13
There were entered by Honorable Judge Jones on
February 7, 1953, the findings of fact and conclusions
R. 64.
R. 28-89.
9
R. 12-15.
10
R. 64.
11
R. 16-17.
12
R. 16.
18
R. 17.
7

8
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of la,Y. Set forth in those findings of fact and conclusions of law is the following statement: ''4. It was
stipulated at the tria.l that in each case of appropriation of water by the United States from a source of
supply from which the objectors [appellants] have
made an appropriation, the priority of the objectors'
rights is senior to the priority of the right of the
United States; * * *.'· Premised upon the stipulation at the trial and upon the other findings of fa.ct,
Judge Lewis Jones declared:
* * * there is no justiciable issue or contest
between the objeGtors, or any of them, and the
United States of America.
In the light of those findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Jones entered an interlocutory
decree in which it was ordered, adjudged and decreed
- that: "1. * * * there is no justicia.ble controversy
between the objectors * * * or any of them, on the
one hand, and the United States of America, on the other
hand, over the claims of the United States of America
listed in the Proposed Determination herein. * * *
2. * * * the objections to the claims of the United
States to the water of Bear River * * * be and they
are hereby overruled and denied and the Petition
setting forth the objections of said objectors is hereby
dismissed.'' 15
Wholly aside from the declaration of the lower
court that there was no controversy between the
- United States of America and the appellants, this
appeal was taken predicated principa.lly upon the
grounds that the United States of America did not
and could not acquire rights to the use of water under
the circumstances of the case.
14

14
15

R.l8-19.
R. 20.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. The United States Attorney had no authority to
enter into the stipulation purporting to bind the
appellants and the United States of America in connection with the rights claimed by the latter in the
action in the district court.
2. Rights to the use of water and the priorities
asserted in connection with them are substantive
rights in the nature of real property and neither the
United States Attorney nor any Attorney of the Bureau of Reclamation were empowered to relinquish
those rights.
3. This is a.n action against the United States of
America, which has not, under the circumstances,
waived its immunity from suit.
J
4. Sovereign immunity from suit may be waived
only by specific Congressional enactment; no officer of
the United States, in the absence of express authority,
may waive that exemption or subject the propert~' of
the United States of America to jurisdiction: that
immunity from suit exists whatever the character of
the proceedings, including the action to adjudicate
rights to the use of water.
5. .Assuming that the lower court had jurisdiction
of the claims of the United States, which is denied,
there is no basis for this appeal, as there is no controversy a,Ihong the parties.
,:)

'
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ARGUMENT

I
There was no authority in any official of the Department of
Justice or any other department to stipulate in regard to the
rights to the use of water of the United States as revealed
by the record and Exhibit I of this brief

By the stipulation 16 of September 10, 1952, the then
United States .Attorney sought to bind the United
States of .America in a manner 'vhich, if valid, would
have resulted in the relinquishment by the United
States of .America of valuable rights to the use of
water. Similarly, the Attorney for the Bureau of
Reclama.tion purported to relinquish priorities in
connection with certain other rights originally set
forth in the stipulation of September 10, 1952.17 As
declared above, a careful review of the records of the
Attorney General of the United States fails to disclose that either the then United States Attorney or
the Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation was empowered to bind the United Sta.tes in the manner proposed or that the acts of either were ratified. Thu,~
the stipulations of those attorneys are not and could
not be binding upon the Attorney General. Unfortunately for all concerned, the interests of the United
States in this matter are of such magnitude that the
Attorney General on behalf of the Nationa;l Government may not now ratify those stipulations and
accordingly they are rejected.
The powers of the United States Attorney to stipulate in connection with litigation of the character
16

Exhibit I.

17

R. 64.
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here involved are clear and unequivocal. His a.uthorization at that time was as follows:
In no case shall a field attorney* enter into an
agreed statement of facts or a stipulation to
abide the result in another case or any stipulation concluding the substantive rights of the
United States without specific authority from
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Lands Division.18
Absent specific authorization from the Attorney
General of the United States to the United States
Attorney, the latter would be powerless to proceed in
the manner attempted. Relative to the broad powers
of the Attorney General, reference is made to the investiture of authority in that official by the Congress
of the United States. It is provided that: "* * *
The Attorney General shall have supervision over all
litigation to which the United States or any agency
thereof is a party and shall direct all United States
attorneys * * * in the discharge of their respective
duties." That and correlative enactments 19 vest in
the Attorney General plenary power over litigation
in which the United States is engaged. In numerous
*Field Attorney includes United States Attorney.
Department of Justice, Lands Division, Field Instructions,
page 19, Subdivision E. The present authorization is: "In no case
shall the United States Attorney or field Attorney enter into an
agreed statement of facts or a stipulation to abide the result in
another case or any stipulation concluding the substantive ri~hts
of the United States without specific authority from the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Lands Division." United
States Attorneys' Manual, Title 5, Lands Division, page 2,
Stipulations.
19
28 U.S. C. 507 (b); 5 U.S. C. 300 et seq.
18
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instances the courts have considered the powers of
the Attorney General. 20
In an authoritative decision respecting the powers
of an official of the United States of America to employ counsel to represent the United States independent of representation by the Attorney General, this
statement "·as 1nade: '' * * * quite aside from the
respectable authority that c-onfirms our view, we
should have had no doubt that no suit can be brought
except the Attorney General, his subordinate, or a
district attorney under his 'superintendence and
direction,' appears for the United States." 21
There can be little doubt of the power of the Attorney General under the circumstances to require
prior specific approval of all stipulations of the character of those by which the then United States Attorney and the Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation attempted to bind the United States. Necessarily, with the full responsibility residing with the
Attorney General, his subordinates could not be permitted to stipulate in connection with substantive
rights of the United States of America-absent his
approval or the approval of an Assistant Attorney
General.
Cognizant of the immense value of water in the a.rid
""\Vest,- particularly in connection with the vast grazing areas here affected, the Attorney General cannot
permit the loss of priorities in connection with those
rights to the use of water through unauthorized
agreements of the character here involved. Historically, a.nd for soundest reasons, the Attorney Gen20 United States v. San Jacinto Tin Oo., 125 U.S. 273,279 (1887),
Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F. 2d 676 (U. S. Ct. App. D. C. 1939), cert.
denied, 307 U. S. 628. See also 81 A. L. R. 124.
21
Sutherland v. International Insurance Oo. of Neto York, 43
F. 2d 969, 970 (C. A. 2, 1930).
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eral has exercised with great care the power to relinquish claims of the United States of America to
property or to funds. Referenc·e in that regard is
made to an opinion written in reply to a question
presented by the Secretary of the Treasury as to
whether that official ha.d the power to compromise a
claim of the United States which was in litigation.
Asserting that there resided in the Attorney General
the sole power to dispose of claims in litigation, the
opinion referred to contains this declaration: "Except as modified by the statutes already cited [which
have no bea.ring here] the power to determine whether
compromises should be made of pending litigation,
would seem to rest with this Department, as the suits
are necessarily under my control and subject to my
direction.'' 22 Contained in the opinion last cited is
this pertinent declaration taken from an earlier pronouncement: ;~ ''He [the Attorney General] exercises
superintendence and direction over United States
attorneys and general supervision over proceedings
instituted for the benefit of the United States, and
to him is necessarily intrusted, in the exercise of his
sound professional discretion and because of the
nature of the subject, the determination of many
questions of expediency and propriety affecting the
continuance or dismissal of lega.l proceedings. * * *
He may absolutely dismiss or discontinue suits in
which the Government is interested; a fortiori he may
terminate the same upon terms, at any stage, by way
of compromise or settlement.'' Continuing, the Attorney General declared, in denying the power of the
Secretary of the Treasury to compromise a. suit:
"Without expressly deciding whether I am authorized
2

22
23

23 Opin. Atty. Gen. 507, 508.
22 Opin. Atty. Gen. 491, 494.
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to compromise an adverse claim against the Government under this general power to conduct its litigation, I am clearly of opinion from an examination of
the papers that the present suit should not be com·
promised, but that the United States attorney should
be instructed to press the case to a final decision.'' 24
Manifest from the authorities cited is this:
All litigation of the character here involved
is lmder the direction and superintendence of
the Attorney General. Power to stipulate in
com1ection with claims in the manner attempted
resides ·with the .A.ttorney General. Only pursuant to specific authority from the Attorney
General 'vas the United States Attorney empowered to enter into the stipulation in question.
He did not have that specific authorization, nor
has the stipulation ever been approved by the Attorney General. It necessarily follows that the
Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation was
without power to compromise the rights of the
United States of America in the manner attempted.
As the then United States Attorney was without
authority to stipulate in connection with the claims of
the United States, he was without power to bind the
United States in the manner proposed. Moreover,
"* * * the rule requires of all persons dealing with
public officers, the duty of inquiry as to their power
and authority to bind the government; * * *. '' 25
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently adhered to that principle.26
24

23 Opin. Atty. Gen. 508, 509.
Hume v. United States, 132 U. S. 406, 414 (1889).
26
Logan County v. United States, 169 U. S. 255 {1897).
~
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It is the principle adhered to by this Court. On the
subject this Court made the statement: ''The Federal
courts have held without exception * * * that it [the
United States] is not botmd or estopped by the acts
of such officers or agents not within the scope of their
authority." 27
The highest Court has long recognized that unauthorized acts involving litigation in which interests
of the United States are involved are not binding
upon it. 28 This general statement and the authorities
upon which it is premised is especially pertinent under
the circumstances : ''An officer can * * * bind his
government only by acts which come within the just
exercise of his official powers and within the scope
of his authority, * * *. An unauthorized act or declaration of an officer does not estop the government
from insisting on its invalidity.
"Unless duly authorized by law, a board or officer
may not waive the state's immunity from suit; nor
may an officer of the United States, without statutory
authority, waive conditions or limitations imposed hy
statute in respect of suits against the United
States. * * *." 29
Further comment respecting the lack of authority
in the United States Attorney or the Attorney for the
Bureau of Reclamation to enter into the stipulations in
question is unnecessary. That the stipulations involved
substantive rights is a matter to be considered in the
phase of the brief immediately succeeding.
21

Petty et al. v. Borg, 106 Utah 531, 150 P. 2d 776, 779 (1944);
see also cited cases.
28
Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255 (1895); Utah Pol!'er &
Light Oo. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916).
29
43 Am. Jur., Public Officers, Sec. 254, p. 71.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

II
The rights to the use of water claimed by the United States
of America are interests in real prop.erty-they are substantive rights

It is, of course, an elementary proposition, long
recognized by this Court, that a water right is
usufructuary and does not partake of the ownership
_ of the corpus of the 'vater itself.30 "This usufructuary right, or ·water-right,' * * * is real property.
It is as fundan1ental under the law of riparian rights
as under the law of appropriation.'' 31 From the same
source as the last quoted statement this precept is
taken: .. The right to the flow and use of ·water, being
a right in a natural resource, is real estate. * * *
The right to have water flow from a river into a ditch
is real property. A wrongful diversion of water is
an injury to real property. The right to take water
from a river and conduct it to a tract of land is
realty. * * * An action to quiet title as for real
property is proper. And an action to settle rights is
one to quiet title to realty." Moreover, a right to the
use of water has "all the dignity of and is an estate
of fee simple, or a freehold." 32 Premised on a re- view of pertinent decisions this conclusion has been
expressed : ''As has been held in numerous cases, a
water right is real property." 83

° Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Oo., 12 Colo. 12, 17, 19
Pac. 836 (1888); Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P. 2d 702
(1942); Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 1112 (1910).
See also Lindsey v. M cOlure, 136 F. 2d 65, 70 (C. A. 10, 1943) .
81
Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, 3d ed., vol. 1, sec.
18, pp. 20, 21.
82
Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States, 3d ed., vol. 1, sec.
283, pp. 298-300 ; Sec. 285, p. 301.
88
19 Rocky Mountain Law Review 63.
3
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From the statements and authorities cited, it is
evident that a right to the use of water is an estate in
real property. However, the value which may be
placed on such a right is dependent very largely upon
the priority to which it is entitled insofar as that
right relates to others from the same source. The
preceding statement is simply a recognition of the
fundamental concept of water law that, ''First in time
is first in right." That maxim is the essence of the
doctrine of prior appropriation. With reference to
the subject, this statement has been made: "this court
has repeatedly held that priorities of rights to the
use of water are property rights. Such is the settled
doctrine in this state. * * * Property rights in water
consist not alone in the amount of the appropriation,
but also in the priority of the appropriation. It often
happens that the chief value of an appropriation consists in its p1~iority over other appropriations from the
same natural stream. Hence, to deprive a person of
his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable property right * * *. '' 84
From the cited authorities it is evident that rights
to the use of water are in the nature of interests in
real property and that those rights together with the
priorities asserted for them are substantive rights concerning which the United States Attorney was powerless to stipulate in the absence of specific authority
from the .A.ttorney General.
III
The action in the District Court was against the United States
of America, involving its rights to the use of water

The action in the court below involved rights to
the use of water -claimed by the United States of
84

Nichols v. Mcintosh, 19 Colo. 22, 26, 27, 34 Pac. 278 (1893).
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n

~ Ameriea and the priorities which it asserted in con-

~ nection with those rights. From the authorities cited
~!

above, it is evident that those rights are in the nature
of interests in real property. Suits of the character
from \Yhich this appeal has been taken have been described by this Court to be actions for the purpose of
determining rights to the use of \Yater and to quiet
title among n1.unerous elnimants on a stream. The
~ issues, this Court has pointed out, involve the rights
of the parties for and against each other to all of
the waters of the stream system.35 The Supreme
Court of the United States has established the criterion pursuant to ·which a determination may be
- made as to whether a cause is against the sovereign.
It declared if ''the judgment sought would expend
itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere
;., with the public administration * * * -the suit is one
. ,. against the sovereign.'' 36 That precept has been recog:~- nized on numerous occasions by the Supreme Court
of the United States. 37 Moreover: "A proceeding
~~ against property in which the United States has an
~ interest is a suit against the United States." as Free
'C
from doubt, therefore, is the fact that the action is
~
against the United States of America with all of the
~
incidents arising from that fact.
~'

1

:t

1

Huntsm?le Irrigation Association v. District Oourt of Weber
Oounty, 72 Utah 431, 270 Pac. 1090 (1928).
36
Land v. Dollar, 330 U. S. 731, 738 (1946).
37
Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1895); Larson v. Domestic
and Foreign Corporation, 337 U.S. 682 (1948).
38
Minnesota v. United States, 305 U. S. 382, 386 (1938).
35
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IV
The United States of America is immune from suit in the ab.
sence of specific waiver-anyone asserting there has been a
waiver of that immunity must bring his case within the act
upon which he relies

In the factual review set forth above the statement
is made that the Attorney General of the United
States of America has not been served in this action.
In that regard this fact is respectfully emphasized:
There was no authority and there is no authority in
any official of the United States of America to authorize an appearance in proceedings of the character
here involved under the circumstances which prevail,
in the absence of service upon the Attorney General
of the United States. In a subsequent phase of this
brief that statement will be reiterated and reemphasized. Irrespective of that lack of authority, however, the then United States Attorney participated
in the trial of the issues in the court below which
was commenced on August 20, 1952, though the
original proceedings were initiated several years
earlier. The matter was not concluded at the date
last mentioned but was continued until September
13, 1952. On August 27, 1952, a wire was sent to the
then United States Attorney purporting to authorize
him to appear in the cause to protect the interests of
the United States.39 There was no effort to confer
39

WAsHINGTON,

D. C., August 27, .195t2.

ScoTT M. MATHESON, Esquire,

United States Attorney,
Salt Lake Oity, Utah.
Re General Determination Rights to use of water Bear River
Drainage Area, Rich County, and Randolph Land and Livestock
Company, et al., pending in District Court of Rich County, Utah.
You are authorized to appear in this matter to protect the inter·
ests of the United States in the use of waters claimed by it. It is
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authority upon the . Attorney for the Bureau of Reclamation who, the record reveals, conducted the proceedings on behalf of the United States. Neither was
authority conferred upon the United States Attorney
to stipulate in the manner revealed in Exhibit I of
this brief.
It is necessarily concluded, therefore, that the
participation of the then United States Attorney in
the proceedings did not and could not constitute a
submission of the United States to jurisdiction in the
court below. Similarly the stipulation is without
force and effect for reasons which have been
expressed.
Quite aside from the lack of authority in the then
United States Attorney to make an appearance in
the action, are fundamental tenets of the law which
preclude the Attorney General himself under the circumstances from subjecting the United States of
America to jurisdiction. Necessarily, therefore, an
Assistant .Attorney General or the United States
Attorney could not subject the United States of
America to jurisdiction under the circumstances.
The sovereign immunity from suit is a principle
of law applied equally to the State and Federal governments. Respecting the immunity of the State of
Utah from suit, this Court declared: " * * * action[s]

~~
Jj16

ur.r:

understood that you are familiar with these proceedings and
that you understand that the Bureau of Land Management and
Forest Service both have rights which need protection. All necessary information re Bureau of Land Management claims can be
procured from Regional Administrator and Regional Counsel that
Bureau in Salt Lake City. Contact Forest Service re its claims.
Department is advised hearing will be held Friday, August 29.
Please give Department complete report.
RALPH

J. LU'rl'RELL,

Acting Assistant Attornf!11 General.
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may not be maintained unless the state has, through
legislative or constitutional action, given consent to
be sued. * * * when there is statutory consent to sue
[the State], the statute is the measure of the power to
sue.'' 40 Again, in regard to the immunity of the State
of Utah from suit, this declaration was made: "We
start with the assumption that the sovereign is immune from suit. To find authority for any action
of whatever nature against the state, recourse must
be had to the statutes. * * * There must be substantial compliance with the designated statutory procedure for bringing such actions.'' 41 Adhering to the
principles expressed by Utah's highest court, the
Supreme Court of the United States commented as
follows on the subject: "As we conclude that these
suits are suits against Utah and that Utah has not
consented to be sued for these alleged wrongful tax
exactions in the federal courts, we express no opinion
upon the merits of the controversy. * * * We conclude that the Utah statutes fall short of the clear
declaration by a State of its consent to be sued in
the federal courts which we think is required before
federal courts should undertake adjudication of the
claims of taxpayers against a state.'' 42
In substance the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Supreme Court of Utah have recognized, insofar as the sovereign State is concerned,
that: "It is an established principle of jurisprudence
in all civilized nations, resting upon grounds of public policy, that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own

° Campbell Bldg. Oo. v. State Road Oomm., 95 Utah 2-!2, 249,
252, 70 P. 2d 857 ( 1937).
41
State v. Distriot Oourt of Salt Lalce County, 102 Utah 284,285,
115 P. 2d 913 (1941).
42
l1ennecott Oopper Corp. ''· State Tax romm., :3~7 P. :--1. !li:~.
576, 579, 580 ( 1945).
4
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courts or in any other court without its con~ent and
permission.'' 43
Identical principles "~ith those enunciated above l'(~
speeting the sovereign inuunnity of the State of Utah
from suit are applicable to tlw United States. That
conclusion has been recognized by the Supreine Court
of the United States in these tel'lns: "The exemption
from direet suit is * * * without exception. * * *
(The United States] cannot be subjected to legal proceedings, at la-w or in equity, without thei1· consent;
and whoever institutes such proceedings must bring
his case ·within the authority of some act .of
Congress.'' 44
\\ith reference to the immunity of the United
States of .America from suit respecting rights to the
use of water, this statement has been made: "The
suit is essentially one to determine the validity of the
claimed \Y2ter right, which if valid, might present a
question of priority and extent, * * *. * * * There
being no consent by Congress to the suit, the bill must
be dismissed * * *.'' 45 Consistent with the principle
that the immunity of the United States from suit is
without exception, is the statement of the Supreme
Court of the United States respecting the effort on
the part of the State of Arizona to institute an action
involving its claimed rights to water on the Colorado
River. In dismissing Arizona's petition the Court
said this: '' * * * we are of the opinion that in the circumstances disclosed by the bill of complaint there
can be no adjudication of rights in the unappropriated
water of the Colorado river without the presence, as
49 Am. Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, Sec. 91.
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10,16 (1895).
45
United States v. Mclnti1'e, 101 F. 2d 650, 653 (C. A. 9, 1939).
43

44

278(177-53--4
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a party, of the United States, which, without it'3 consent, is not subject to suit even by a state." 46
In the light of the principles enunciated above, there
arises the question of whether the filing of claims by
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management subjected the United States to the jurisdiction
of the court below. Similarly the question is presented as to whether the acts of the United States
Attorney eould subject the National Government to
the jurisdiction of the court under the circumstances
revealed by the record.

v
Neither the United States attorney nor any other official would
be empowered to subject the United States to suit absent a
waiver of immunity from suit by Congress

As disclosed above, the immunity of the United
States of America from suit is without exception.
It is manifest that Congress and Congress alone has
the power to waive that immunity. Clearly there
is no authority in the United States Attorney or any
other official of the United States of America to
waive that immunity. That principle of sovereign
immunity has been recognized in a vast variety of
cases and eirClunstances. On the proposition it has
been emphatically declared by the Supreme Court of
the United States that: "Where jurisdiction has not
been conferred by Congress, no officer of the United
States has power to give any court jurisdiction of a
suit against the United States." 47
.. Arizona v. Oalifornia, 298 U. S. 558, 568 ( 1935).
41 Minrwsota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382,388, 389 (1938).
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Particularly relevant to this phase of the consideration is one of the principal decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States on the subject. 48 Seldom
will a case be found whi{;h is more precisely in point
on a proposition under consideration. In that case,
as here, an effort \vas made to authorize the United
States Attorney to appear in an action instituted in a
State court against properties of the United States.
That suit, as here, Y\·as in substance an action to quiet
title to real property against claims asserted by the
United States. In declaring that the official in question was \Yithout authority to subject the rights of
the United States to jurisdiction of the State court the
Supreme Court of the United States declared in these
spe{;ific terms: "It is a fundamental principle of
public la\v, affirmed by a long series of decisions of
this court, and clearly recognized in its former opinion in this case, that no suit can be maintained against
the United States, or against their property, in any
court, without express authority of Congress. 147
U. S. 512. See also Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10.
The United States, by various acts of Congress, have
consented to be sued in their own courts in certain
classes of cases; but they have never consented to be
sued in the courts of a State in any case. Neither the
Secretary of War nor the Attorney General, nor any
subordinate of either, has been authorized to waive the
exemption of the United States from judicial process,
or to submit the United States or their property, to
the jurisdiction of the court in a suit brought against
their officers. Case v. Terrell, 11 Wall. 199, 202; Carr
v. United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438; United States v.
L·ee, 106 U. S. 196, 205." 49 Turning then to the action
·48

"' 9

Stanley v. Sohwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1895).
Stanley v. Sohwalby, 162 U. R 255,269-270 (1895).
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taken by the United States Attorney who filed responsive pleadings in the cause before the State court,
this succinct and pertinent statement was made:
a The answer actually filed by the District Attorney,
if treated as undertaking to make the United States
a party defendant in the cause, and liable to have
judgment rendered against them, was in excess of the
instruction,s of the Attorney General, and of any
power vested by law in hi1n or in the District Attorney, and could not constitute a voluntary submission
by the United States to the jurisdiction of the
court." 50 [Emphasis added.]
-Important in connection with this matter are the
distinguishing elements between the appropriation of
rights to the use of water and the adjudication of
them. On the subject this statement has been made:
"The acquiring of water rights for the purpose of
irrigating land, and the determination by courts of
what those rights are, after acquirement, are entirely
different subjects, * * *." 51 Where there is involved
the question of the adjudication of rights, the immunity of the United States from suit in the absence
of waiver, is a bar to bringing an action. In the case
last cited this comment was made: "The suit being
one against the United States, the court is without
jurisdiction, in the absence of an act of Congress waiving immunity from suit." 52 An examination of the
statutes fails to reveal any basis upon which the filings
by the Forest Service or the Bureau of Land Manage-ment could subject the United States to jurisdiction in
a State court.
Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255,270 (1895).
North Side Oanal Oo. v. Twin Falls Oanal Oo., 12 F. 2d 311,
314 (D. C. S.D. Idaho, 1926).
112
North Side Oanal Oo. v. Twin Falls Oanal Oo., 12 F. 2d 311,
313 (D. C. S.D. Idaho, 1926); U.S. v. M('/nti.re, 101 F. 2d 650.
60

51
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VI
Section 208 of the Department of Justice Appropriation Act
of 1952 has no application to this case (43 U.S. C. 666)

The ...~ttorney General of the United States of
America has not been served in this case. Yet the act
cited in the caption of this phase of the brief contains
this requiren1ent: ''Summons or other process in any
such suit [adjudication of rights to the use of water]
shall be serYed upon the .._L\..ttorney General or his
<lesignated representative." Important here is the
fact that th~ Attorney General of the United States
of America has not and in view of the authorities
cited above, it is respectfully submitted, could not
waive the req~.1irements regarding process. Also, as
emphasized above, the Attorney General of the United
States of America has not authorized any officer of the
Department of Justice or of any other Department to
waive the requirement that process be served upon
him. Thus the purpo-rted authorization to the then
United States Attorney was a nullity and could not
effectuate a submission of the National Government
to the jurisdiction of the court below or of this Court.
Having failed to serve the Attorney General or in
any way to bring that official before the court, it is
evident that the principles respecting the immunity
from suit which have been reviewed at length above
constitute a bar to the joinder of the United States
in the case. As discussed above, " * * * whoever institutes such proceedings [against the United States]
must bring his case within the authority of some act
of Congress." 53 Further, as stated above, any waiver
of immunity of the United States from suit must be
53

Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10,16 (1895).
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strictly construed.54 Respecting actions against States
this authoritative statement has been made: " * * *
most courts hold that statutes waiving the state's
immunity from suit and permitting suit to be brought
against it, being in derogation of sovereignty, must be
strictly construed.'' 55 In conformity with that doctrine as revealed above, the consent of the State of
Utah to be sued for an occupation tax refund "in
any court of competent jurisdiction'' was not construed by the highest tribunal as a consent to be sued
in federal court.56 Conforming to the principle
enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States,
it has been held that a statute is jurisdictional which
requires a notice to be filed with the Attorney General
of the State prior to bringing a claim against the
State of New York. 57
A correlative principle militating strongly against
the joinder of the United States in the action are
basic tenets of statutory construction. Fundamental
in that connection is the precept that: "Retrospective
operation [of a statute] is not favored by the courts,
* * * and a law will not be construed as retroactive
unless the act clearly, by express language or necessary implication, indicates that the legislature intended a retroactive application." 58 It has likewise
been declared that: "Because of the intuitive belief
that there is something inherently bad in retroactive
legislation, some states have adopted express constitutional provisions against retroactive laws." 59 While
United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 502 (1939).
49 Am. Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies, Sec. 97,
p. 314.
56
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State TaaJ Commission, 327 U.S.
573 (1945).
57
Buckles v. State, 221 N.Y. 418, lli N. E. 811 (1917).
58
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., vol. 2, page ll!'i.
59
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., vol. 2, page 119.
54

55
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the State of Utah i~ not among those States lnentioned, there is no reason to assnnle that this IIonorable Court would find retroactive laws less repugnant
than other courts have found them. Yet only by
treating Section 208 of the Department of Justice
Appropriation Act of 1952 as being retrospective is it
possible to apply it to this case. That act was enacted
ten years subsequent to the initiation of the subject
case. Certaip. of the claims-the so-called ''diligence
claims~ ·-were filed ten years subsequent to the initiation of the suit.
Predicated upon the above principles, it is respectfully submitted that the United States was not before
the district court below and any action taken there is
without effect insofar as the interests of the United
States are concerned.
VII
Assuming the District Court had jurisdiction, which is denied,
this Court will not consider moot questions

A consideration of the record in the case reveals
that there is no actual controversy-no justiciable
issue before the Court. There is nothing in the record which reveals that either the Bureau of Land
Management or the Forest Service are utilizing water
which the appellants claim they are entitled to receive. Thus it is manifest that there is no conflict
in fact between the United States of America and the
appellants. Moreover, assuming that the stipulations
had validity, or that the district court had jurisdiction
over the properties of the United States, it is clear
that the United States Attorney had stipulated in a
manner which removed any possible conflict among
the parties. It is evident as a consequence of those
facts that the appellants have presented to this court
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a moot question. That an appellate court will not
assume jurisdiction of moot questions is a tenet of
the law too well established to contend against. The
Supreme Court of the United States has long adhered to that fundamental tenet. On the subject it
has stated:
To predetermine, even in the limited field of
water power, the rights of different sovereignties, pregnant ·with future controversies, is beyond the judicial function. The courts deal
with concrete legal issues, presented in actual
cases, not abstractions. 60
.Again the same Court declaring that the fundamental principles limiting adjudications to actual
cases and controversies are not affected by the fact
that it would be convenient to the parties and to the
public to have a particular matter resolved stated:
vVe deal, however, not with the theoretical disputes but with concrete and specific issues
raised by actual cases. * * * "Constitutional
questions are not to be dealt with abstractly."
* * * They will not be anticipated but will be
dealt with only as they are appropriately raised
upon a record before us. * * * Nor will we
assume in advance that a State will so construe its law as to bring it into conflict with the
federal Constitution or an act of Congress.81
This Court adhering to the same principles enunciated a.bove declared in regard to an action to quiet
title : "We see no merit" in this appeal in connection with a request by an appellant to have reviewed a
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Oo., 311 U. S.
377, 423 (1940), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712.
56
Allen-Bradley Local v. Board, 315 U. S. 7+O, 746 ( 1941);
see also Arizona v. Oalifonda, ~8:~ P. ~. 42:~~ 46a, +Ci-l (1 nao).
60
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quiet title decree which revealed that there was no
substantial controversy among the parties.62 The
opinion of this Court in a 1nore recent decision contained this sta.tement :
Even courts of general jurisdiction have no
power to decide abstract questions or to render
declaratory judgn1ents, in the absence of an
actual controversy directly involving rights.88
That doctrine has been adhered to by this Court in
litigation inT"olving rights to the use of water.64 There
it is declared:
Before the plaintiff in this suit ca.n be heard to
complain because he has been deprived of the
use of the water flowing from the springs in
question, he must establish some right to the
use of such water or a part thereof. * * *
The plaintiff, being without any right in the
water here in controversy, cannot be heard to
complain because the owner so uses the water
that pla.intiff derives no benefit from such use.
The trial court properly entered judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
As the record in this case reveals no conflict be..;
tween the appellants and the United States of
America, the doctrine of the last cited case, it is respectfully submitted, is controlling.
More recently, this Court reiterated the same prineiple.65 That principle has been adhered to by courts
in other Western States.66
62

Fitzpatrick v. Brown, 41 Utah 139,142,124 Pac. 769 (1912).
University of Utah v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 64
Utah 273,229 Pac. 1103, 1104 (1924).
64
Gianulakis v. Sharp, 71 Utah 528, 267 Pac. 1017, 1019 (1928).
65
Gillet al. v. Tracy et al., 80 Utah 127, 13 P. 2d 329, 333 (1932).
66
Binning v. Miller, 55 'Vyo. 451, 102 P. 2d 54, 62 (1940);
Denver & Rio Grande ll7 estern R. Oo. v. Himonas, 190 F. 2d ipi2
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63
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As emphasized by the Supreme Court of the State
of Wyoming:
The discussion is wholly academic. Before a
party may attack the right of another, either
on constitutional or other grounds, he must
first show that he himself has a right which
has been inva.ded thereby. He must have an
interest which is affected.67
The principles reviewed uphold the judgment below of Judge Lewis J ones.68 Those cited opinions
bear out this C'onclusion on the general proposition:
''The province of a court is to decide real controversies, not to discuss or give opinions on abstract
propositions or moot questions. The duties and
powers of courts are, therefore, limited to the determination of rights actually controverted in particular
cases before them. * * * courts have neither the
right nor the inclination to express a.n opinion upon
moot questions or questions not arising on the facts
before them, since such questions require no answer.
* * * An appellate court will not give an opinion
upon the request of the parties and for their guidance
in a case not properly before it and in which it has
no jurisdiction. '' 69
.As appellants are unable to disclose any invasion
of their rights the matter presents no issue to this
Court. They allege no present injury and vaguely
refer to the possibility that the United States of
America proposes to dominate and to control privately-owned property through applications for appropriations. 'rhere is not a scintilla of evidence that
there is such an intention on the part of the United
67

Campbell et al. v. Wyoming Development Oo. et al., 55 Wyo.
347, 100 P. 2d 124, 140 (1940).
68
Hu1d.<n·i1Tc In·. ~hs11. v. /Ji.·dri<·t roul/'f, 7:2 Utah -l:H, 2i0 P:lr.
1090 ( 1928).
69
l4Am. Jur., Courts, Sec. 49.
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States. .Appellants' efforts to secure a ruling on these
abstract qut'stions fall squarely within the JH'{'ecpt of
the law that the rourts deal only with legal issues
presented in actunl rases in which there exists a
genuine controYersy. U ndC'r those circumstances, it
- is respectfully submitted, this Honorable Court should
dismiss the appeal on the grounds that there is no
justiciable issue, thus sustaining the judgment of
Judge Lewis Jones in the court below.
Though the appeal should be dismissed for want of
- a justiciable issue it is reiterated and reaffirmed on
the principles reviewed above that the district court
__ was without jurisdiction by reason of the fact that the
United States had not "\-vaived its immunity from suit
under the circumstances which prevail. It is likewise reiterated that the officers who sought to represent the United States of America and to bind it by
the stipulations alluded to, acted without authority
in the matter.

VIII
Neither the officials of the Bureau of Land Management nor
the officials of the Forest Servic.e were empowered to subject
the United States to jurisdiction under the circumstances

Appellants cite no authority, and it is respectfully
submitted that there is no authority, which would
permit representatives of the Bureau of Land Management or of the Forest Service to subject the United
States of America to the jurisdiction of the district
court by the mere filing of applications With the State
Engineer. It is likewise respectfully submitted that
the properties of the United States are not controlled
by the legislature of. the State of Utah. 70 Similarly it
is respectfully submitted that, ''State laws cannot
affect titles vested in the United States of America." n
0amfieldv. United States, 167U. S. 518 (1896).
''
Pnited Stutes '"· Uta.h, 28;3 U. S. 64, 7:> (1930). See also EnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That the United States of America is not subject to
the police regulations of the State is too well established for question. 72 Thus the laws relied upon by
the appellants have no bearing upon the rights or
interests of the United States.
Irrespective of those fundamental tenets of the law
the appellants urge that the United States of America
has no rights to the use of water for the thousands of
head of livestock which graze upon the lands of the
National Government administered by the Bureau
of Land Management and the Forest Service. Their
assertions, however, are purely academic for the
record reveals no encroachment or threat of encroachment by the United States of America upon the vested
rights of the appellants. As emphasized above, there
was no justiciable issue presented in the court below
nor is there an issue here in regard to the respective
rights of the United States of America and the
appellants.
CONCLUSION

Predicated upon the authorities reviewed above, this
Honorable Court is respectfully requested to dismiss
this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

J. LEE RANKIN,
Assistant Attorney General.

A. PRATT KEsLER,
United States Attorney.
107) ; Constitution of Utah, Article III; Utah Powe1· & Light Co.
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1916).
72
Hunt v. United States, 278 U. S. 96 ( 1928) ; Arizona v. OoMfornia, 283 U.S. 423 (1930); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523
(1911). See also 13 A. L. R. 2d 1095.
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ExHIBIT

I

In the District Court of Rich County, State of Utah

:IN

THE ~lATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION OF

RroHTS To THE UsE oF WATER oF BEAR RIVER DRAINAGE

AREA

IN RICH COUNTY, UTAH

Stipulation

The water rights asserted by the United States of
America in this case are limited to rights which
- can be acquired under the laws of the State of Utah.
Any sovereign rights which the United States of
. America might claim in or with respect to the waters
of Bear River as an interstate stream, are not listed
in the Proposed Determination of the State Engineer,
- and are not before the court. The alleged water
rights of the United States consist of (1) so-called
"diligence rights" based upon an alleged beneficial use
- initiated prior to 1903 and evidenced by water users'
- claims filed with the State Engineer allegedly pursuant to the provisions of Section 3, Chapter 97, Laws
of Utah 1949, and (2) applications for appropriation
of water filed by the United States allegedly pursuant
to the provisions of Chapter 3, Title 100, Utah Code
, Annotated 1943, as amended.
It is stipulated:
1. On or about April 2, 1951, the United States of
America filed with the State Engineer water users'
claims numbered 1104 to 1115, both inclusive, which
claims are listed as diligence claims in the Proposed
Determination on pages 361 and 362. The diligence
claims are based upon the use of water for stock
~

(33)
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watering purposes by livestock operators and others
who in the past have grazed livestock on the public
domain. Such use commenced in 1875 and has continued down to the present time.
2. The United States of America has neither owned
nor operated any of the livestock which has watered
at the sources of supply or at any of the watering
places listed in either the claims of diligence rights or
in the applications for appropriation. Any beneficial
use of the waters with which the United States or any
governmental agency is here concerned is a use made
by livestock exclusively owned and operated by interests other than the United States of America.
3. No grazing permits were issued on the Cache
National Forest by the United States Forest Service
prior to 1906·, and no permits for grazing of livestock on public lands of the United States outside of
the national forest were issued prior to 1935.
4. In filing the aforesaid diligence rights claims on
April 2, 1951, the officials of the United States at
whose instance said claims were filed, did so in the
belief that the past use of the water at the points
listed in the claiiQs, by livestock operators, has inured
to the benefit of the United States of America. In
filing the applications to appropriate water, the government officials at whose instance such applications
were filed, did so with the purpose of acquiring for
the United States of America, water rights through
the use of water by livestock operators grazing livestock under permits issued by the United States for
the use of forage grown on public lands.
5. The sources of water supply described in the socalled "diligence rights" claims described above, and
in the applications for appropriation filed by the
United States of America as listed below, arise gen·
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erally upon public lands of the United States, with
the possible exception of Little Crawford Spring,
shown in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination as Claim ~o. 2'75. "\Vaters from some of said
sources run off the public lands, onto privately owned
lands of objectors and other~. 1\ll stremns referred
to in the diligence claims listed above, and in the
applications for appropriation listed belov.r, run
through public lands and also through privately owned
lands in Rich County, Utah. The objectors and other
livestock opera tors in the area concerned, own ranches
and also range lands, through which these streams
run. Some of these privately owned lands border
upon and some lie across each of the streams mentioned in the claims filed by the United States of
America. Objectors and other livestock operators also
own lands in the vicinity of each of the streams and
springs hereinabove m,entioned, so that the waters
involved in controversy can be properly utilized by
livestock which graze on these privately owned lands.
6. The following applications for appropriation of
water were filed by the United States with the State
Engineer of the State of Utah, were approved by him
and according to the records of his office are in good
.standing:

17239
17240
17272
20337
16881
16877
A-2388
16879

16788
16787
19622
16791
20077
16806
16884
21297

16809
16883
16805
16880
16785
19954
16885

7. The following applications for appropriation of
water were filed by the United States with the State
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Engineer, were approved by him, but subsequently
such applications lapsed or were withdrawn:

17241*
16887
16878

16886
16807
16810

19872
16790
16786*

16789
16808
16882

8. The objectors herein claim rights as listed in the
State Engineer's Proposed Determination, on the
same streams or water courses, but downstream from
points of diversion specified in the claims or applications of the United States of America. Objectors
also claim rights in opposition to the claims of the
United States as listed in the State Engineer's Proposed Determination, designated as follows:
United States'

Objectors'
Source
Claim
682
508
275
499
495
500

Page
156
166
129
173
152
155

Claim
Upper Otter Creek Spring______________________________
Upper Otter Creek---------------.----------------------Little Crawford Spring__________________________________
Hawk Spring___________________________________________
Old Canyon Spring_____________________________________
Otter Creek Spring______________________________________

(S)
(S)

Page

779
779
780
784
795
774

328
328
327
328
328
326

A. OMAN,
E. REIMANN,

MILTON
PAUL

BY MALL,

Counsel for Objectors, Randolph Land and
Livestock Company, Deseret Livestock
Company, Bountiful Livestock Company,
Harold Selman, Nick Chournos, On•il
Johnson, William Johnson.
( S) Scott M. Matheson,
ScoTT M. MATHESON,

U. S. Attoruey.
J. LAMBERT GIBSON,
Attorney for State !Cn,qiHcl'r.

(S)
No.--.
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In the District Court of the First Judicial District
of the State of Utah, in and for the County of Rich.
Filed September 10, 1952.
( S) ADOLPH 'V. LARSON,
Clerk.
By------

Deputy.
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